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ABSTRACT 
Protecting data in the cloud continues to 
gain in importance, with encryption being 
used to achieve the desired data protection. 
While there is desire to use encryption, 
various cloud components do not want to 
deal with key management, which points to 
a strong need for a separate key 
management system. OpenStack Barbican 
is a platform developed by the OpenStack 
community aimed at providing 
cryptographic functions useful for all 
environments, including large ephemeral 
clouds. Barbican exposes REST APIs 
designed for the secure storage, 
provisioning and management of secrets 
such as passwords, encryption keys, and 
X.509 certificates, and supports plugins for 
a variety of crypto solutions in the backend. 
Crypto plugins store secrets as encrypted 
blobs within the Barbican database. 
Software based crypto plugins offer a 
scalable solution, but are vulnerable to 
system software attacks. Hardware 
Security Module (HSM) [9] plugins offer 
strong security guarantees, but they are 
expensive and don’t scale well. We 
propose to build an Intel® Software Guard 
Extension (Intel® SGX) based software 
crypto plugin that offers security similar to 
an HSM with the low cost and scalability 
of a software based solution. We extend 
OpenStack Barbican API to support 
attestation of an Intel® SGX crypto plugin, 
to allow clients higher confidence in the 
software they are using for storing keys. In 
addition, the API provides support for 
mutual attestation for Intel® SGX enabled 
clients, multi-user key distribution, and 
extensions for protecting the 
confidentiality and integrity of the backend 
database.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
OpenStack [2] is becoming a cloud OS of 
choice in cloud space. To provide strong 
data protection in the cloud, encryption is 
typically used to protect the data in transit 
as well as data at rest. Key management 
continues to be a big challenge for all the 
cloud components that use encryption.  In 
the OpenStack environment, there is a shift 
towards using a centralized key 
management system called Barbican [1]. 
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Intel® SGX [8] is a new technology that 
allows applications to create areas in the 
application address space to run code 
where integrity and confidentiality of that 
code is protected inside the CPU.  In this 
paper we present a solution to build an 
Intel® SGX based crypto plugin for 
Barbican. This plugin offers security 
similar to an HSM with the low cost and 
scalability of a software based solution. In 
addition, we also extend OpenStack 
Barbican API to support attestation of SGX 
crypto plugin, to allow clients higher 
confidence in the software they are using 
for storing keys. Optionally, for Intel® 
SGX  aware clients, we also support mutual 
attestation, where Barbican plugin can 
attest to the client before releasing the 
secret. Our extended REST API also 
provides supports for multi-user key 
distribution, where the owner of the secret 
can specify additional parties that are 
allowed to extract secrets, based on a well-
defined access control list.   
We seamlessly integrated our solution into 
the OpenStack environment and all 
components using Barbican can now be 
configured to use an Intel® SGX based key 
store with no impact to the rest of the 
system.  
 
 Our contributions in the paper are: 
• Architecture and design of a new 
Intel® SGX based crypto plugin for 
OpenStack Barbican called BarbiE. 
• Complete end-to-end solution with 
support for attestation of BarbiE as 
well as mutual attestation for Intel® 
SGX enabled clients. 
• Support for multi-user key 
distribution to achieve secure key 
distribution among third-party 
trusted enclaves irrespective of their 
owners. 
• Protection of data with 
confidentiality and integrity while 
on storage on a backend database. 
• Evaluation of BarbiE (the Barbican 
Enclave) in a scalable cloud 
deployment of OpenStack Mitaka 
[10]. 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 OpenStack Overview 
OpenStack is an open-source cloud 
operating system designed for public and 
private cloud infrastructure deployment 
and management that enables the use of 
multivendor commodity hardware and 
relies on software to provide an “eventually 
consistent” means of fault tolerance/high 
availability. It consists of many 
subprojects, each targeted at managing 
independent aspects of the cloud OS. 
The OpenStack platform at its heart consist 
of 6 core projects that provide various 
services.  Core projects are those that 
implement OS functionality that meets 
both public and private cloud deployment 
needs and is deemed the single best 
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implementation by the OpenStack 
community.  Each of these projects can be 
instantiated and run separately as they have 
been designed to be plug-and-playable, 
allowing users to pick and choose 
components to meet their needs. However, 
these projects really work best together.  
Let’s quickly examine the current state of 
the OpenStack platform core. 
The Nova project abstracts computing 
resources in an immensely scalable fashion 
and is able to run on physical hosts from a 
multitude of vendors while exposing 
compute resources via a multitude of 
virtualization vendors (e.g. VMWare, 
XEN, KVM (Kernel Virtual Machine), 
etc.). Swift provides scalable and redundant 
object storage purely implemented in 
software allowing for low cost commodity 
drives to be used while maintaining high 
availability.  Networking resources are 
abstracted by the Neutron project which 
exposes software defined networks to 
address scalability of deployments.  Cinder 
exposes block storage capable of being 
backed by different types of storage 
technologies (supports standard Linux 
server, EMC, Hitachi Data Systems and 
IBM Storage). Glance is the subsystem for 
managing disk images in OpenStack 
allowing for a deployment to manage itself 
with minimal downtime.  Refer to the 
OpenStack documentation [13] to learn 
about other optional projects as there are a 
handful not listed above.   
Authentication and access control is 
managed by the Keystone project [14].  
Keystone hosts a central user directory that 
is mapped to a services registry that allows 
access based querying of resources.  
Keystone is the common authentication 
system for OpenStack but can also be 
integrated with other backend 
authorization systems. Before a user can 
interact with any of the OpenStack 
projects, it needs to get a token from 
Keystone and then that token is used for 
authentication for interacting with various 
OpenStack components, including 
Barbican. 
 
2.2 Intel Software Guard Extensions  
Intel® SGX is a new processor technology 
that allows applications to create secure 
areas in memory called enclaves. These 
enclaves provide applications with a 
trusted execution environment where 
confidentially and integrity of any code and 
data inside the enclave is protected inside 
the CPU package boundary. In addition, 
Intel® SGX also provides a mechanism to 
remote parties to verify the identity of the 
enclaves via a process called attestation.  
2.2.1 Overview  
Intel® SGX provides a trusted execution 
environment for security sensitive 
applications. It provides applications the 
ability to create areas in memory called 
enclaves that provide confidentiality and 
integrity for the code/data running inside it, 
even in the presence of buggy or malicious 
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privileged software. An application 
developer partitions the code into trusted 
and un-trusted parts. The un-trusted part of 
the application loads the code that needs 
trusted execution environment inside an 
enclave. Once the enclave is built and 
initialized, no-one can tamper with the 
code and data inside it with access 
protected by the CPU.  
2.2.2 Attestation 
Attestation is a process that allows remote 
parties to verify the identity of a piece of 
software. Intel® SGX supports attestation 
[11] where any code running in an enclave 
can generate a report, which includes the 
enclave’s identity and, with the help of an 
Intel® SGX SDK provided architectural 
enclave called a Quoting Enclave, can 
generate attestations, called quotes, to send 
to a remote party for verification. The 
remote party can use Intel’s SGX 
attestation hosted service to verify the 
quote before provisioning any secrets into 
the enclave.   
2.2.3 Sealing 
Intel® SGX supports a mechanism called 
sealing [12] for cryptographically binding 
any secrets to an enclave. Any enclave can 
use a hardware generated key, called a seal 
key, to encrypt the secrets with the key. 
The key is only available to the owner 
enclave running on the same platform. 
 
2.3 OpenStack Barbican  
 
2.3.1 Overview 
OpenStack Barbican [3] is a platform 
developed by the OpenStack community 
aimed at providing cryptographic functions 
useful for all environments including large 
ephemeral clouds. Barbican exposes REST 
APIs designed for the secure storage, 
provisioning and management of secrets 
such as passwords, encryption keys and 
X.509 Certificates [5]. 
 
2.3.2 Architecture 
Figure 1 below describes the high-level 
architecture of OpenStack Barbican (larger 
views of all figures in this paper are in the 
appendix section) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  OpenStack Barbican 
 
Clients interact with API nodes using 
REST APIs. API nodes can directly service 
some of the requests synchronously, 
otherwise they put the requests in messages 
queues to be handled by the worker queues 
asynchronously. This architecture supports 
scalable design where multiple API and 
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worker nodes can be added/deleted as 
needed.  
 
2.3.2.1 Barbican storage mode for Secrets 
(plugins) 
Barbican supports two modes for storing 
secrets. In secret mode, Barbican offloads 
both encryption/decryption and encrypted 
secure storage to a plugin and is not 
responsible for storing any encrypted 
secrets in its own data store. Some 
examples include Redhat Dogtag service 
and Key Management Interoperability 
Protocol (KMIP) [15]. In cryptographic 
mode, Barbican supports in-memory 
crypto or an appliance like an HSM to 
perform encryption/decryption. In this 
mode, Barbican core stores encrypted 
secrets in Barbican’s data store. Some 
examples include Barbican in-memory 
simple-crypto plugin or a PKCS11 based 
interface to an HSM. 
 
2.3.2.2 Barbican Secret Management 
Cloud users can offload sensitive parts of 
their application by securely storing them 
in Barbican. Barbican further protects these 
user secrets in a backend database using 
encryption keys. Barbican can also 
generate sensitive information, from AES 
keys for disk encryption to X.509 
certificates used to secure application 
servers and load balancers. To bootstrap 
the server’s ability to securely manage user 
secrets, an administrator must provision a 
Key Encryption Key (KEK) per project. 
The KEK is used to encrypt/decrypt secrets 
as they are placed into and retrieved from 
the backend DB. In addition, session keys 
(SK) are used to protect any data in flight 
after a secure session has been established. 
 
3. Intel® SGX Enabled KMS 
Architecture 
 
Figure 2.  High Level Architecture 
 
As shown in Figure 2, Intel® SGX enabled 
KMS system is architected to provide 
complete protection of secrets while at rest, 
in use, and in transit. As discussed in 
section 2.2, Intel® SGX provides hardware 
root of trust capabilities that provide 
integrity and confidentiality of data inside 
an enclave as well as allow an enclave to 
prove its trustworthiness to a challenger.  
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Figure 3.  KEK Provisioning 
 
The SGX Barbican server (a.k.a, Intel® 
SGX KMS, used interchangeably) 
implements an Intel® SGX enclave that is 
responsible for performing all 
cryptographic operations, manage 
encryption keys, and seal objects into 
databases for secure storage. This enclave 
is also responsible for proving its 
trustworthiness to external applications 
that intend to store application secrets and 
encryption keys in the Intel® SGX KMS 
server. Once the client establishes trust 
with the Intel® SGX KMS system using 
the Intel® SGX remote attestation 
protocol, it can also request the Intel® 
SGX KMS system to generate PKI and 
symmetric keys on the application’s behalf.  
Since OpenStack Barbican implements a 
plugin model for various modes of 
operation, the Intel® SGX enclave is 
wrapped as a crypto plugin that fits inside 
the Barbican core stack. The Intel® SGX 
enclave itself is built as a C/C++ library 
and the plugin is implemented in python 
with python to C CFFI bridging between 
the two. The Intel® SGX crypto plugin 
layer hides and abstracts Intel® SGX 
specific details from the Barbican core 
system. As shown in figure 3 Intel® SGX 
enclave is responsible for securely storing 
client secrets and it uses a master key called 
KEK for that purpose. The KEK is either 
generated inside the enclave during 
initialization or provisioned remotely by 
the administrator for a scale out 
deployment. The KEK is kept sealed using 
enclave’s sealing feature, as opposed to 
plain text format of simple crypto plugin in 
legacy Barbican. 
The database is also enhanced to enforce a 
strict to liberal level of access to secrets 
under a particular tenant/project. This is 
done by using the Intel® SGX security 
properties like signer, measurement, 
ISV_SVN, and CPU_SVN as identity 
parameters for access authentication. In 
addition, for non Intel® SGX clients, 
keystone token ID and client public key 
could also be used for identification and 
access control. 
However, to use the Intel® SGX KMS in a 
truly secure manner, we recommend that 
the client application also use an enclave on 
its side to interact with the server. This 
would allow the Intel® SGX KMS to be 
able to securely authenticate the client 
using the Intel® SGX remote attestation 
process. However, to maintain 
compatibility with legacy clients, the 
Intel® SGX KMS server seamlessly 
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supports legacy APIs with no change in the 
message exchange format.  
3.1 Barbican Clients  
Our goal for cloud infrastructure providers 
is to make the transition from a legacy 
Barbican system to an Intel® SGX enabled 
Barbican system as smooth as possible 
with minimal or no impact to their current 
customer base. Therefore, we consider the 
following types of clients to be interacting 
with the Intel® SGX KMS system. 
3.1.1 Legacy Barbican Clients  
These are the Barbican clients that are not 
aware of Intel® SGX but still be able to 
talk to the SGX Barbican server without 
any changes using the current v1 (version 
1) interface (e.g., GET /v1/secrets). These 
clients will still use the legacy protocol to 
talk to Barbican and perform key 
management.  The SGX Barbican server 
will encrypt the secrets with a KEK inside 
the enclave. The REST interfaces remain 
the same for these clients and the enclave 
in the SGX Barbican server can be updated 
without notifying these clients.  
 
3.1.2 Intel® SGX Aware Barbican Clients  
These are new Barbican Clients that are not 
Intel® SGX enabled but rely on the 
presence of the Intel® SGX enclave on the 
SGX Barbican server and challenge the 
server through a remote attestation 
protocol before storing any secrets. The 
attestation APIs are available as standard 
REST v2 APIs (ex. GET /v2/secrets) and 
the response from the server, which would 
be an Intel® SGX quote, can be validated 
using Intel Attestation Service. These 
clients also support multi-user key 
distribution by setting an access control list 
while storing the secrets.  
 
3.1.3 Intel® SGX Enabled Barbican 
Clients  
These are new Barbican Clients that are 
also Intel® SGX enabled. These clients 
support all the features supported by Intel® 
SGX aware clients, but they also require 
the SGX Barbican server to challenge the 
client before releasing the secrets back to 
the client. 
 
3.2 SGX Barbican Server Crypto 
Plugin (BarbiE) 
The Intel® SGX hardened Barbican crypto 
plugin was designed to enhance the 
protection of user secrets while in use, at 
rest, and in transit to/from the client/server.  
To achieve these objectives, the key Intel® 
SGX features that are employed are 
memory protection, sealing, and remote 
attestation.    Intel® SGX sealing is a 
feature in which the hardware is able to 
generate a key for an enclave that is tied to 
a unique enclave identity or signature.  This 
allows for an enclave to keep secrets by 
using this key to encrypt data it wishes to 
be protected when outside of the enclave 
boundary (e.g., in main memory or at rest 
on the disk).  By leveraging Intel® SGX 
remote attestation, we are able to securely 
provision a key from the Barbican client to 
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the Intel® SGX Barbican server.  In our 
case, this key will be the secure channel 
key (SK), which will be used to 
encrypt/decrypt traffic in flight.   
At the heart of our hardened Barbican 
implementation is an Intel® SGX enclave, 
which we have named BarbiE (the 
Barbican Enclave).  Per the Intel® SGX 
programming model, there is an untrusted 
application responsible for hosting or 
loading the trusted enclave within its 
virtual address space.  The Intel® SGX 
enabled Barbican crypto plugin exercises 
the trusted actions provided by BarbiE by 
communicating with the untrusted part of 
the SGX Barbican crypto plugin 
application via CFFI (C Foreign Function 
Interface).  These actions exposed by the 
untrusted part of the plugin can be either 
untrusted or trusted.  In the case of a trusted 
action, the API call will result in an 
ECALL or an entry into BarbiE to fulfill 
some task. 
3.3 Mutual Attestation (MA) 
Intel® SGX allows an enclave to prove its 
trustworthiness to a challenger via remote 
attestation protocol and BarbiE exposes 
that support to Intel® SGX aware clients. 
In addition, we also support BarbiE 
challenging the receiver of the secret if the 
client is running inside an enclave on an 
Intel® SGX enabled client. With enclaves 
at each end of the transaction we are able to 
attest to the trustworthiness of both parties 
involved.  We call this method of trust 
establishment Mutual Attestation (MA). 
3.4 Multi-User Key Distribution 
In a distributed architecture, different 
components deal with same secrets. The 
owner of the enclave may want to allow 
other components in a system to have direct 
access to the secret. With multi-user key 
distribution feature, we provide a 
mechanism for the owner of the secret to 
provide an access control list to BarbiE for 
secret distribution. This can be done by 
using the Intel® SGX security properties 
like signer, measurement, ISV_SVN, and 
CPU_SVN as identity parameters for 
access authentication. In addition, for non 
Intel® SGX clients, keystone token ID and 
client public key could also be used for 
identification and access control. 
3.5 Protection of backend Database 
In OpenStack Barbican, access to secrets 
by tenants/projects are controlled using 
ACLs maintained in a Database. These 
ACLs are present in a tenant ID/project ID 
mapping table within the Barbican 
database. The security model in SGX 
Barbican is that all cryptographic 
operations are performed only inside 
BarbiE. Any confidentiality or integrity 
breach of the database will not directly 
result in secrets being compromised. 
However, if an attacker is able to modify 
the tenant ID/project ID mappings by 
manipulating the database records, it could 
grant the attacker unauthorized access to 
secrets (stored by the Intel® SGX Barbican 
enclave inside the DB) using Barbican’s 
regular REST APIs. For example, the 
attacker can alter session keys records in 
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the DB to copy encrypted session key of a 
user to be attacked in its own row. After 
successful mutual attestation (as the 
attacker is a registered user with 
OpenStack Barbican), the attacker will 
gain access to session key of user to be 
attacked. To prevent this from happening, 
we cryptographically tie the encrypted 
values in the DB with the tenant/project ID. 
For this mechanism to work correctly, we 
also need the tenant/project ID information 
to be provided by the client securely 
(through the secure channel). In this way, 
altering the DB records by an attacker will 
not work anymore and can be 
detected. Also, we need a replay protection 
mechanism in the DB such that any record 
in the DB when replaced with an old record 
can also be detected. Replay protection of 
persistent data has not been implemented in 
the current version of the prototype, but is 
supported by Intel® SGX architecture. 
 
4. Intel® SGX Enabled KMS Design 
In section 2.2 we described Intel® SGX at 
a high level, Specifically providing a brief 
introduction of the memory protections, 
data sealing, and remote attestation (RA).  
These Intel® SGX features when 
combined provide protection of secrets at 
rest, in use, and in transit.   Section 3 
introduced our architecture specific keys 
SK and KEK. SK is used to protect secrets 
in transit to/from the client/server and KEK 
is used to protect content that is database 
bound on the server end.  This section will 
explore a potential implementation based 
on Intel® SGX features, SK, and KEK that 
allows for secure end-to-end protection of 
user secrets in a cloud manager such as 
OpenStack Barbican.  We will now 
describe the implementation of the Intel® 
SGX Barbican server and its interaction 
with Intel® SGX aware and Intel® SGX 
enabled clients. 
4.1 Session Key (SK) Negotiation 
Remote Attestation of an Intel® SGX 
enclave allows a remote challenger to 
cryptographically verify the 
trustworthiness of attesting enclave. In our 
implementation, BarbiE is an Intel® SGX 
enclave and clients are able to challenge it 
via REST APIs as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Remote Attestation REST 
APIs 
An Intel® SGX aware client can use these 
REST APIs and the APIs provided by the 
Intel® SGX SDK to facilitate the RA 
(MSGX processing/generation) and 
negotiate an SK.  Intel® SGX aware clients 
should inspect the BarbiE quote/identity 
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prior to completing the RA flow to ensure 
the BarbiE identity is as expected.   
A client running on Intel® SGX capable 
hardware can instantiate an enclave itself 
for further protections on the client side.  
With enclaves at each end of the 
transaction, we are able to attest to the 
trustworthiness of both parties involved.  
We call this method of trust establishment 
Mutual Attestation (MA).  
 
4.1.1 Mutual attestation flow 
The flow for negotiating SK during Mutual 
Attestation is shown below in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  SK negotiation during Mutual 
attestation 
During the mutual attestation process, the 
client enclave first does a remote 
attestation of the server enclave. During 
this process both client and server enclaves 
derive a shared key using the sigma 
protocol. Client enclave then generates a 
nonce, calculates SHA2 of its own and 
server enclave’s Intel® SGX report and 
then sends s_msg4 to the server enclave as 
shown in Figure 5.  
The server enclave now does a remote 
attestation of the client enclave and verifies 
the SHA2 signature of the client and its 
own Intel® SGX reports with the ones sent 
in s_msg4. If they match, the server 
enclave is confirmed to be communicating 
with the correct client enclave. It then 
generates a session key (SK) and sends 
both the nonce (received in s_msg4) and 
the SK in c_msg4 back to the client 
enclave.  
The client enclave does a match of the 
nonce received in c_msg4 with the one 
originally sent. If they match, the client 
enclave is confirmed to be communicating 
with the correct server enclave and 
continues to use the SK for secret 
management.  
Details on the sigma session between 
BarbiE server enclave and client enclave 
using REST APIs are shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Mutual Attestation REST 
APIs 
In case of Mutual Attestation, Barbican 
server records the client enclave’s 
identity/quote as found in RA MSG3.  The 
quote contains a few additional fields but it 
only records MRENCLAVE (the 
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measurement of the client’s enclave) and 
MRSIGNER (signer of the client’s 
enclave) fields.  These fields will allow the 
Barbican server enclave to verify and 
return secrets only to valid Intel® SGX 
enabled clients.  Intel® SGX enabled 
OpenStack Barbican is enhanced to 
support three types of policy enforcement. 
This is done by adding new model in 
database with SK, policy, MRENCLAVE 
and MRSIGNER for corresponding 
tenant/project. Policy can be set after a 
successful RA or MA. RA supports policy 
number 3 and MA supports policies 1, 2 
and 3. Policy type combined with 
MRENCLAVE and MRSIGNER 
determines the level (strict to liberal) of 
authentication and authorization. 
Policy 1 : Match measurement of the client 
enclave. If a project policy is set to ‘1’ then 
MRENCLAVE of client enclave must 
match with the MRENCLAVE of the 
project owner stored in database when the 
policy was set. 
Policy 2 : Match signer of the client 
enclave. If a project policy is set to ‘2’ then 
MRSIGNER of client enclave must match 
the MRSIGNER of the project owner 
stored in database when the policy was set. 
Policy 3 : Match multiple client enclave 
measurements. If a project policy is set to 
‘3’ then MRENCLAVE of client enclave 
must match with one of child 
MRENCLAVEs stored by the project 
owner in database when the policy was set. 
In either case ISV_SVN should also be 
taken into consideration such that the 
retriever ISV_SVN is >= that of the storing 
party’s ISV_SVN to prevent compromised 
enclaves from accessing the secrets of 
patched enclaves. 
 
4.2 Multi-User Key distribution 
In a distributed architecture, different 
components deal with same secrets. In 
OpenStack for example, Cinder block 
storage might be the entity that 
generates/stores a secret in Barbican for 
encrypted volumes, but Nova compute 
node is the entity which actually uses that 
secret and needs access to it. In this 
scenario, Cinder and Nova clients will have 
different MRENCLAVEs. Hence, there 
needs to be a mechanism to share a session 
key(SK) with multiple enclaves under 
same tenant/project. 
This is achieved by policy ‘3’ enforcement 
in Intel® SGX enabled OpenStack 
Barbican. This policy verifies the 
MRENCLAVE of the requesting client 
(including the identity of the owner enclave 
passed by the client) with the list of 
MRENCLAVES stored in the database for 
the tenant/project by the owner. This list 
specifies the enclaves to which the secrets 
will be accessible. 
The access control design can also be easily 
extended to achieve per secret access 
control policy rather than per project/tenant 
policy.  
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4.3 Secret Management 
All secrets sent to the Barbican server via 
an Intel® SGX aware client require an SK 
(session key) be negotiated via either RA 
(remote attestation) or MA (mutual 
attestation) to protect secrets in flight.  
Let’s now explore how the SK is used to 
provision the KEK (key encryption key, or 
master key) and how both SK and KEK are 
used in secret store and retrieval flows.  
The KEK is the key material used for all 
cipher text in/out from the backend DB.  
No plain text is stored in the DB and the 
KEK is protected in flight via the SK and 
at rest on the server disk using sealing. 
Figure 7 shows the REST interactions 
exposed to an admin client to facilitate the 
KEK provisioning.  The admin simply 
needs to perform an RA or MA to negotiate 
an SK, then provision the SK encrypted 
KEK (SK_KEK) to the server, at which 
point the server stores the KEK sealed on 
disk such that it is recoverable across 
restarts of the enclave without admin 
intervention. This KEK can also become 
the master KEK for the entire setup. In that 
case the individual projects/tenants would 
get their own individual KEKs generated 
and sealed on disk using the master KEK 
 
Figure 7.  Master Key (KEK) 
Provisioning REST APIs 
Once a KEK is provisioned, the server is 
ready to process secret management 
requests (store/retrieval) on behalf of its 
users. Figure 8 shows the secret 
management flow, all of the required 
artifacts, and the cipher text 
transformations, while Figure 9 depicts the 
API flows. 
 
Figure 8.  High Level Architecture 
 
 
Figure 9.  Secret Management REST 
APIs 
The client and server must first negotiate an 
SK via either RA or MA. The client 
wishing to store a secret should then 
encrypt the said secret (generating 
SK_SECRET) with the SK and then via the 
/v2/secret REST API send the cipher text 
and metadata to the server.  The server will 
(within BarbiE) decrypt the user secret 
with the SK and encrypt with KEK 
(generating KEK_SECRET) which will 
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produce cipher text that is DB appropriate 
and should be stored along with the quote 
retrieved during SK negotiation in the case 
of MA. Upon successful record insertion a 
reference ID (REF_ID) is returned as the 
storage request response.  A client wishing 
to retrieve a secret presents a valid REF_ID 
to the server. In case of an RA provisioned 
secret, the server refers to the policy set for 
allowing access to SK_SECRET. Refer to 
section 4.1 for details. However, the owner 
entity of the secret can still access the 
secret using the original session key 
negotiated during the RA session. In case 
of a secret provisioned via MA, the server 
will challenge the client enclave via reverse 
RA (see section 4.1.1) to obtain the SGX 
parameters of the caller.  At this point a 
policy based decision will be made 
regarding whether or not to return the 
SK_SECRET to the client.  As previously 
stated in section 4.1, the choice of fields in 
the quote used for verification is 
implementation specific. 
4.4 Database Integrity protection  
To bind session keys encrypted with a 
master key with its respective 
tenant/project we use AES GCM 
Additional Authentication Data (AAD) 
mechanism. During Mutual Attestation, 
client needs to provide its tenant/project ID 
as part of msg4, which is to be sent to the 
server enclave. This will help in securely 
provisioning the ID from client to server. 
This ID will then be used as AAD during 
encryption of tenant/project specific 
session key inside enclave before storing 
them to the DB. As tenant/project ID is part 
of Mutual Attestation, for an attacker to 
have successful MA, it would have to 
provide its own ID in msg4. Even with this, 
they won’t be able to gain access to session 
keys of other users even after altering the 
DB due to ID mismatch during decryption. 
 
5. BarbiE Cloud Deployment and Usage 
A single cloud service implementation has 
a finite capacity, which can lead to runtime 
exceptions and performance degradation 
when its processing thresholds in terms of 
compute power and available memory are 
exceeded. 
There are two ways to overcome this 
problem. One method would be scale-up 
the deployment that involves adding more 
compute power, memory and I/O 
bandwidth to the same physical instance. 
The other way is to scale-out by running 
redundant deployments of the same 
instance. Typically, in this type of 
deployment, a load balancing system is 
added to dynamically distribute workloads 
across cloud service implementations. 
The multiple cloud service 
implementations are organized into a 
resource pool. As shown in figure 10 the 
load balancer is configured as an external 
or consumer facing component, allowing 
internal service applications to balance 
workloads among themselves. 
Depending on the type of application, the 
load balancer can be configured stateless or 
stateful wherein state information inside 
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HTTP headers can be used by the load 
balancer to make more intelligent 
balancing decisions. The load balancer gets 
all the messages sent by cloud service users 
and forwards the messages at runtime to the 
actual service instances in a way such that 
the workload processing is horizontally 
scaled.  
 
Figure 10.  Cloud Deployment 
A point to note here is that a load balancer 
can be positioned either independent of the 
cloud service or be built-in as part of the 
application. However, when built-in as part 
of the application, the service applications 
will be responsible to form a cluster of 
master and slave nodes where the master 
node takes the decision of routing requests 
to slave nodes based on the request. 
An SGX Barbican server would also be 
predominantly deployed as a cloud key 
store to allow cloud users to be able to 
offload confidential or sensitive aspects of 
their projects to a secure storage.   
Cloud based applications can replace 
sensitive information such as encryption 
keys, database passwords, and unique 
hyperlinks, etc., that are securely stored in 
SGX Barbican for later retrieval.	 SGX	
Barbican encrypts that sensitive 
information inside an Intel® SGX enclave, 
which is then stored inside a DB. The 
encryption key used by the Intel® SGX 
enclave (aka KEK) is provisioned by the 
administrator using the remote attestation 
protocol [11] 
Alternatively, for a single instance SGX 
Barbican server, the KEK provisioning 
step can be made optional as the Intel® 
SGX sealing key (or a key derived from the 
sealing key) could be used as the KEK. 
However,	once these Intel® SGX Barbican 
server instances are scaled out on different 
hardware platforms, the sealing key KEK 
method will not work anymore as Intel® 
SGX enclaves running on different 
hardware platforms will derive different 
KEKs. Hence, on a scaled design, it is the 
responsibility for the administrator to 
provision the same KEK in all Intel® SGX 
Barbican instances before bringing them 
online.  This way, all Barbican instances 
are identical and stateless accessing a 
common database and any of the instances 
can handle requests in any order as all 
transaction states are maintained in the 
database. 
Figure 12 shows how a typical scaled SGX 
Barbican setup would look like 
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Figure 11.  SGX Barbican Scaled 
Deployment 
The following steps show how this setup is 
initialized and used by a user or a cloud 
application  
Step 1. SGX Barbican instances are created 
(inside VMs or containers) 
Step 2. All those instances point to the 
same database system. 
• DB system can also be distributed 
for high availability and throughput 
Step 3. Administrator performs remote 
attestation with each and every SGX 
Barbican enclave instance to gain trust of 
the enclave and establish a secure 
encrypted channel for data transfer.  
Step 4. Admin uses the admin interface to 
provision KEK on all SGX Barbican 
instances using the secure channel 
established in the previous step 
Step 5. An HTTP load balancer is 
configured to connect to all these instances 
on an internal network.  
Step 6. User connects to load balancer to 
perform remote attestation of SGX-
Barbican 
Step 7. Load balancer chooses a routing 
policy (random, load based or round robin) 
to route the request to any instance as they 
are identical and store internal states in a 
common DB. 
Step 8. User completes remote attestation 
with instance x and establishes a secure 
channel. Both parties now have a shared 
key (SK). Optionally, user can also set 
multi-user access control based on SGX 
measurement of third party enclaves. Refer 
to 4.1 and 4.2 for more details 
Step 9. Instance x encrypts shared key 
using the KEK and stores it in DB 
Step 10. User now sends request for “secret 
store” by encrypting the user payload with 
the shared key 
Step 11. Request goes to instance#1 
Step 12. Instance#1 finds shared key 
encrypted in DB 
Step 13. Instance#1 decrypts user payload 
using shared key and encrypts it with KEK. 
Step 14. Instance#1 stores the encrypted 
user secret in DB 
Step 15. User now requests previously 
stored secret from SGX-Barbican system. 
Third party access to the secret is allowed 
by SGX enabled clients based on the access 
control policy set on the project (refer 
section 4.1 and 4.2) 
Step 16. Request goes to a different 
instance this time.  E.g., instance#4 
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Step 17. Based on the request, instance#4 
either does an attestation of the user 
enclave or decrypts shared key and user 
secret with KEK. If the request is for 
attestation, then it sends the shared key 
over the secure channel after a successful 
policy matching attestation flow 
Step 18. Instance#4 encrypts user secret 
with shared key and returns the payload to 
the user 
Step 19. User decrypts payload with shared 
key to retrieve original plain text secret. 
 
Intel’s SGX remote attestation protocol 
requires a quoting enclave service that 
signs the report of application enclaves to 
generate a quote. This quote contains 
information to establish a shared key using 
Diffie-Hellman(DH) method [16]. The DH 
protocol requires multiple message 
exchanges between the remote party and 
enclave endpoint. The following figure 
shows a high level flow of SGX remote 
attestation protocol between challenger and 
application enclave. 
 
 
Figure 12.  SGX Remote Attestation 
 
SGX Barbican system implements these 
message exchanges as REST APIs. The 
REST APIs for remote attestation are 
themselves stateless, but carry context 
references in the message body to complete 
the remote attestation protocol. The 
following time-line flow diagram shows 
how individual components of the SGX 
Barbican system interact with each other 
using REST APIs to establish shared key 
based secure channel [11].  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  SGX Remote attestation on 
scaled deployments 
 
On a load-balanced setup, however, 
sequential requests cannot be guaranteed to 
land on the same instance. In fact, the load 
balancer ensures that sequential requests 
are distributed across different service 
instances to balance the load. Therefore, 
remote attestation REST calls pertaining to 
the same session cannot be guaranteed to 
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land on the same instance and hence are 
bound to fail.  
To work around this issue, we must 
configure some stickiness (e.g., a cookie) 
in the load balancer that is sent back during 
the first response. The cookie basically tells 
the load balancer which node to select for 
routing the request. During the remote 
attestation process, the client ensures to use 
the same cookie for all remote attestation 
calls made to establish a secure channel. 
Once a secure channel has been 
established, the client can ignore the cookie 
for all subsequent transactions. 
 
6. Threat Model 
KEK in Barbican is used to protect user 
secrets and we make sure that we provide 
confidentiality and integrity guarantees for 
KEK. In addition, session key (SK) is used 
to protect any data in flight after a secure 
session has been established. In the 
following sections, we will discuss the 
threats and mitigations against various 
assets managed by SGX enabled Barbican.  
 
6.1.1 Confidentiality Threats and 
Mitigations 
Asset Attack Mitigation 
KEK 
Adversary 
accesses 
KEK 
On Server: Protected 
-In use by the enclave 
-At rest via sealing 
-In flight via RA DH 
On Admin machine: Out of 
scope 
SK 
Adversary 
accesses 
SK 
On Server and SGX enabled 
Client: Protected 
-In use by the enclave 
-At rest via KEK encryption 
-in flight via RA/MA DH 
On Legacy Client: Out of Scope 
User 
Secrets 
Adversary 
accesses 
user 
secrets 
On Server and SGX enabled 
Client: Protected 
-In use by the enclave 
-At rest via KEK encryption 
-in flight via SK encryption 
On Legacy Client: Out of Scope 
 
Table 1.  Confidentiality Assets, threats 
& mitigation 
 
6.1.2 Integrity Threats and Mitigations 
 
Asset Attack Mitigation 
KEK 
Adversary 
manipulate
s KEK 
On Server: Protected 
-In use by the enclave 
-At rest via sealing – subject to 
replay attack 
-In flight via RA DH 
On Admin Machine: Out of 
scope 
SK 
Adversary 
manipulate
s SK 
On Server and SGX enabled 
Client: Protected 
-In use by the enclave 
-At rest via KEK encryption – 
subject to replay attacks 
-In flight via RA/MA DH 
On Legacy Client: Out of 
Scope 
User 
Secrets 
Adversary 
manipulate
s user 
secrets 
On Server and SGX enabled 
Client: Protected 
-In use by the enclave 
-At rest via KEK encryption 
-In flight via SK encryption 
On Legacy Client: Out of 
Scope 
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Table 2.  Integrity Assets, threats & 
mitigation 
 
6.1.3 Authentication Threats and 
Mitigations 
Asset Attack Mitigation 
Legacy 
Client 
Identity 
(Author
ization 
Token) 
Adversary 
accesses 
Authorizatio
n token 
On Legacy Client and 
Server: Out of Scope 
(Legacy Authorization agent 
protections) 
Client 
Enclave 
Identity 
Adversary 
manipulates 
enclave 
identity 
On Legacy Client: N/A 
On SGX enabled Client: 
Protected 
On Server: 
-In use by the enclave 
-At rest via KEK encryption 
– subject to replay attacks 
-In flight via MA DH 
 
Server 
Enclave 
Identity 
Adversary 
manipulates 
enclave 
identity 
On Legacy Client: Out of 
Scope 
On SGX enabled Client: 
Protected 
-In use by the enclave 
-At rest via sealing 
-In flight via RA/MA DH 
On Server: SGX protections 
 
SK Adversary accesses SK 
On Legacy Client: Out of 
Scope 
On Server and SGX enabled 
Client: Protected 
-In use by the enclave 
-At rest via KEK encryption 
-In flight via SK encryption 
 
 
 Table 3.  Authentication Assets, threats 
& mitigation 
 
6.1.4 Database Threat and Mitigation 
 
Asset Attack Mitigation 
Legacy 
Client 
Identity 
(Author
ization 
Token) 
Not stored 
in DB  NA 
Client 
Enclave 
Identity 
Adversary 
manipulates 
DB records 
swapping/re
placing with 
attacker’s 
enclave 
Identity 
On Legacy Client: N/A 
On SGX enabled Client: 
Protected 
On Server: 
-In use by the enclave 
-In DB via AAD with 
projectID 
-in flight via MA DH 
Server 
Enclave 
Identity 
Not Stored 
in DB 
 
NA 
 
SK 
Adversary 
manipulates 
DB records 
swapping/re
placing own 
encrypted 
SK with 
required 
encrypted 
SK 
On Legacy Client: N/A 
On SGX enabled Client: 
Protected 
On Server: 
-In use by the enclave 
-In DB via AAD with 
projectID 
-In flight via MA DH 
KEK Not Stored in DB 
 
NA 
 
7. Performance Evaluation 
We performed Apache benchmark testing 
on a standalone as well as a scaled setup 
under various load conditions. Table 4 
captures the benchmark numbers for single 
Xeon E3 3.7Ghz node running legacy 
Barbican and SGX Barbican. The scaled 
setup was tested with 4 VMs on the same 
platform 
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Metric Legacy Barbican 
SGX 
Barbican 
4x SGX 
Barbican 
Concurrency 
Level 2 2 2 
# of requests 
per user 100 100 100 
# of users 5 5 5 
Mean 
Processing 
Time 
339ms 376ms 101ms 
Mean 
Connect 
time 
3ms 3ms 5ms 
Mean time 
per request 343ms 378ms 107ms 
# Req. 
processed 
per second 
5.83 5.28 18.68 
Mean time 
across all 
connections 
171ms 189ms 53ms 
Total body 
sent 
22100 
bytes 
27900 
bytes 
27900 
bytes 
Total time 
taken to 
complete the 
test 
17.1 
seconds 
18.9 
seconds 
5.3 
seconds 
 
Table 4.  Single node performance 
 
For the 4x scaled SGX Barbican setup, we 
also performed high request count tests; the 
Apache benchmark numbers for the tests 
are listed in Table 5. 
 
Metric 4x SGX Barbican 
# of users 25 
Concurrency 
Level 5 
Requests per 
user 500 
# Req. 
processed per 
Sec 
2.69 
Time taken 
per request 1859ms 
 
Table 5.  High SGX Barbican high 
request count performance 
 
8. Use Cases 
An SGX Barbican server can be used for 
any existing applications that use Barbican 
for their secret management, without any 
modifications, and will a get higher level of 
protection from attacks that a non-SGX 
Barbican server. With modifications, these 
applications will benefit using mutual 
attestation and multi-user key distribution 
feature to build secure end-to-end 
solutions. In addition, an SGX Barbican 
server can also be used independently of 
OpenStack as a standalone Intel® SGX 
protected KMS, and can be used for any 
secret management in the cloud. We will 
highlight some sample usages in the rest of 
this section. 
8.1 OpenStack Cinder 
Cinder is block storage service for 
OpenStack. Cinder uses Barbican for 
managing keys for encrypted volumes and 
communicates with Barbican during 
encrypted volume creation. The volume 
encryption key is never exposed to Cinder, 
but is managed by Barbican. While 
attaching a volume to an instance, the key 
is release to Nova, where it is in the clear 
during use. We are exploring an Intel® 
SGX enabled file system (based on EncFS) 
to protect the key even while in use on the 
Nova compute node. Similar usage can also 
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be applied to OpenStack Swift for object 
store protection. 
8.2 OpenStack Neutron 
Neutron is yet another OpenStack project 
to provide "networking as a service" 
between interface devices. Neutron uses 
Barbican for protecting TLS/SSL private 
keys for TLS/SSL termination load 
balancer. SGX Barbican can provide much 
higher guarantees for protection of such 
private keys. 
8.3 Secure Message Queues 
A message queue is an asynchronous 
communication mechanism between 
different applications in the cloud. For 
applications that are security sensitive, we 
can support Intel® SGX enabled secure 
message queues; messages are always 
stored in encrypted format and only valid 
consumers get access to it.  
The key management of such message 
queues can be handled by SGX Barbican. 
Intel® SGX aware message queue 
publishers will perform mutual attestation 
with SGX Barbican server to get a SK. The 
SGX Barbican server then encrypts 
messages inside its enclave with the SK 
and publish them in queue for consumers. 
The publisher can also set policy in the 
SGX Barbican server to allow messages to 
be accessed only by trusted subscriber 
enclaves. The subscriber enclaves will also 
perform mutual attestation with the SGX 
Barbican server. After a successful mutual 
attestation, the SK will be shared based on 
the ACL. Messages are then de-queued and 
decrypted inside subscriber enclaves.  
8.4  Secure Docker Secrets 
Docker supports protection of secrets such 
as password, keys, and certificates in 
Docker Secrets. Docket Secrets can be 
enhanced directly to use Intel® SGX to 
gain protection of secrets on disk as well as 
in use. Another option is to encrypt secrets 
that are stored in Docker Secrets with a 
master key stored in an SGX Barbican 
server and then using the multi-user key 
distribution feature to allow Intel® SGX 
enabled consumers of the Docker Secret to 
retrieve the master key, so as to be able to 
decrypt the secret for use. This will allow 
end-to-end protection of Docker Secrets 
with minimal modifications to Docker’s 
infrastructure.  
8.5 Secure DRM key management 
Encryption is typically used to protect 
media playback data. Key management 
continues to be a big problem in this space. 
SGX Barbican can be used on the edge 
appliances where keys can be provisioned 
by the backend and all the media is 
encrypted using keys stored and protected 
by SGX Barbican.  
8.6 Secure Telco workloads 
Many Telco workloads that are moving to 
the cloud use encryption for data protection 
in OpenStack environments. We envision 
many usages in Telco space that can benefit 
from our Intel® SGX enabled Barbican 
KMS.  
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9. Related Work 
Fortanix Self-Defending Key Management 
Service (SDKMS) [6] claims to be the first 
cloud service secured with Intel® SGX. 
With SDKMS, you can securely generate, 
store, and use cryptographic keys and 
certificates, as well as secrets, such as 
passwords, API keys, tokens, or any blob 
of data. Applications and containers can 
integrate with SDKMS using legacy 
cryptographic interfaces or using its native 
RESTful interface. It’s not very clear from 
their documentation if they offer Mutual 
attestation, multi-user key distribution or 
integrity protection of backend database.  
 
10. Conclusions and Ongoing Work 
In this paper we demonstrated the 
feasibility of a scalable and performant 
cloud-based KMS that offers almost the 
same security guarantees as a hardware 
HSM, along with the scalability and low 
cost of a software-based solution. We 
demonstrated support for mutual 
attestation as well as multi-user key 
distribution, allowing enhanced 
authentication as well as ease of secret 
distribution in a distributed cloud 
environment. In addition, we implemented 
support for integrity protection of the 
backend database.  
As a next step, we plan to evaluate Intel® 
SGX support in other components of 
OpenStack to allow end-to-end protection 
of secrets. We are also evaluating use of 
SGX KMS as a standalone KMS for use 
with other systems that require key 
protection.   
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Figure 1.  OpenStack Barbican 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  High Level Architecture 
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Figure 3.  KEK Provisioning 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Remote Attestation REST APIs 
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Figure 5.  SK negotiation during Mutual attestation 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Mutual Attestation REST APIs 
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Figure 7.  Master Key (KEK) Provisioning REST APIs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  High Level Architecture 
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Figure 9.  Secret Management REST APIs 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Cloud Deployment 
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Figure 11.  SGX Barbican Scaled Deployment 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  SGX Remote Attestation 
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Figure 13.  SGX Remote attestation on scaled deployments 
